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Introduction
This chapter aims to critically review the context and features of bureaucracy during the colonial period from 1842 and 1997, and then examine whether the bureaucracy under the administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government has continued the colonial practices substantially, or made an adaption in face of the changing political and socio-economic contexts. By deploying the education reforms introduced and enforced by the HKSAR government, this chapter argues that the bureaucratic system founded by the British, with the aim to dominate the process and outcome of the public administration and public policy, has no fundamental changes after 1997. Departing from a purely economic and official discourse and perspective, education reforms are reviewed analytically in light of how the authoritarian bureaucratic system, under the absence of a democratic and participatory polity, has been shaped the stakeholders and then manipulated the policy content. In sum, this study will evaluate holistically and critically the strengths and limitations of bureaucracy to achieve good governance in connection with accountability, transparency, responsiveness and participation, or to enforce political hegemony and manipulation in the name of reform, excellence, and professionalism.
Context
Colonial period During the colonial rule from 1842 to 1997, except for an interval due to the Japanese by the governor in the pre-1997 period and then the Chief Executive from 1997, was supported by the fact that the executive was vested with the power to constitute the Legislative Council. In this connection, government-initiated bills and budgets were never seriously challenged in the Legislative Council (Li, 2007: 31-2) . Also, the 3 government could make and implement policies in the form of administrative instructions or measures without needing to seek the approval of the legislature, then providing another influential channel to penetrate its power in policy implementation.
Pure administrative polity:
Under the leadership of the governor, prior to 1997, many major public policy decisions were actually proposed and articulated by civil servants who served as policy secretaries. With such a systemic arrangement, the political system was actually a bureaucracy-dominated system, with only bureaucrats but no politicians; or bureaucrats became politicians in all but name. The bureaucracy was a single and critical agent within the institution. The deliberate absence of 'politics' was often taken as one of the key features of the governance of Hong Kong (Wong, 2007: 76) . It has been asserted that Hong Kong was a 'pure administrative state' -a state with only administration and without 'politics', according to Harris (1988) -or a 'bureaucratic polity' -a political system run mainly by the bureaucrats (Lau, 1982) .
This political practice served two purposes: (1) the establishment of a depoliticized society in which power and politics were not 'existent' or 'actualized' in the administration, thereby articulating a positive and professional image in which the government operated and governed purely based on efficient, economical and effective management, not on the contestation and bargaining of various political forces and stakeholders within the policy field, and (2) politics and administration should be separated because the former only shapes the public and collective interest in policy formulation and implementation negatively. The public administration, in contrast, was depicted as neutral, impartial and impersonal.
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Top-down consultation:
The government set up a number of advisory and/or consultative committees in different policy areas, including representatives of outside interests with whom the government found it necessary to cooperate, in order to make it work better and to provide a more efficient service for the public. Despite the increasing number of such advisory committees from the 1980s, they were of minor importance and had little to do with influencing government policy. In terms of functions, they served (1) to tap expert advice in the area where the government sought to exercise control, (2) to stimulate action by businesses and other outside interests in directions which the government considered desirable, (3) to take politically embarrassing decisions for which the government preferred to avoid direct responsibility, (4) to ensure the cooperation of voluntary agencies which provide services on the government's behalf, (5) to satisfy the public that the government was concerned about a particular problem and doing something about. The appointment of a committee gives an excuse for postponing any action, and there is always the possibility that by the time the committee reports public interest will have shifted elsewhere and nothing need be done (Miners, 1995: 106-107) . The consultation, on the whole, was manipulative, and symbolic in agenda setting and operation.
In terms of the nature of the civil service, the generalist administrative system, which was adopted in Britain in light of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms introduced gradually in the period 1854-1920, was employed in Hong Kong. This set up a competitive written examination, which aimed to distinguish between clerical and intellectual grades on the basis of holding a university degree, to provide for a unified civil service in which individuals could be transferred from one department to another, and to assess the grounds for promotion based on merit. A hierarchical structure was 5 also deployed to clearly define and bound the various functions. At the top was the administrative class who were normally expected to have university degrees and who were concerned in their day-to-day work with policy and finance. They were assisted in the implementation of policy by the executive class, whose members had usually completed secondary school, and by a clerical class which provided support services to both groups (Scott & Burns, 1988: 19-22) . Since the 1990s, the executive officers also tend to hold undergraduate degrees, given the expansion of the tertiary education during that period. The logic of the generalist system, in this light, was that those selected for the administrative grade should have the qualities of good 'all-rounders'.
They were not expected to have any specific knowledge, but they were expected to have the ability to find out anything they needed to know and to make intelligent policy decisions on specific matters (Scoot & Burns, 1988: 30) . Accordingly, the values embedded in such generalist administrative systems can be described as procedural and instrumental, aiming to deploy bureaucrats to promote and facilitate the policy-making process. Table 1 shows the values and structures common to generalist-dominated administrative systems. • Recruitment of graduates with good university degrees who are potentially innovative.
• Rotation of generalists between departments, and 6 especially in top positions, to bring fresh ideas.
• Further training/education for 'mind-broadening' In order to establish and maintain the esprit de corps of such generalists when they were assigned to various bureaus and departments, common norms were articulated and internalized, including efficiency, neutrality and hierarchical loyalty (Lui, 1988: 137-40).
• Efficiency: This entailed the most economical use of resources to achieve the maximization of results, and followed the classic conception of administrative responsibility, focusing more on how resources were acquired and deployed than 7 on the impact of bureaucratic actions and decisions on society. However, the bureaucracy's concern for cost-efficiency was often accompanied by an ignorance of the unintended outcomes of public policies and administrative capacities, and readily led to the deployment of a managerial and even manipulative approach to operations.
• Neutrality: This required civil servants to put aside their political allegiances and moral views in the execution of their duties, lest their prejudices deflect them from their public assigned responsibilities. In Hong Kong, there have been strict prohibitions on civil servants' involvement in such political activities, as individual civil servants were not allowed to run for public office under the current system. They could not canvass support for any candidate during elections.
Comments on public policies can only be made with official permission. During the late 1980s, in contrast, civil servants were permitted to express their concerns and worries over the post-colonial administration, without fear for their job security or working environment.
• Hierarchical loyalty: Except for the few officials at the apex of the system, the majority of civil servants in Hong Kong were not encouraged to exercise reflective choice in their daily work. Individual moral judgments had little place in a bureaucracy whose operations are bounded and defined with rules. Even when discretion might be required, officials generally preferred to observe departmental regulations rather than risk their careers by making controversial decisions. The readiness of civil servants to accept orders from above was largely attributable to conventional Chinese attitudes of respect for authority and avoidance of conflict.
Worrying that their career advancement may be adversely affected, most officials would naturally perceive compliance with their superiors as being in their own 8 interests. As a form of socialization, training induces employees to look at their jobs from a conformist perspective, thereby subtly modifying their views and beliefs to conform to those of the organization. The proverb: 'Do more and make more mistakes, do little and make few mistakes, do nothing and make no mistakes' has been a lively description of the mentality of civil servants in face of this working environment.
The above values reflect the fact that civil servants are instruments within the mechanism, with the purpose of following strictly the stance and ideas of the government to design, formulate and implement policies in a top-down approach. In this regard, they can perform effectively when the institutional and political environment is generally stable without any challenges and criticisms from the public.
Also, the emphasis on efficiency reinforces a commitment to small government and the provision, until the 1970s, of only minimal and limited social services, the need to maintain fiscal frugality and to obtain 'value of money' (Scott, 2005: 36) . In other words, the government saw policy implementation as a matter of targets which had to be met on time and within budget. It was not particularly concerned with the process of how these targets were achieved. Those opposed to its proposals were regarded as obstacles to implementation (Scott, 2010: 9) .
However, the changing social, economic and political contexts since the 1990s due to the question of Hong Kong's political future, and the unprecedented economic turbulence due to globalization and economic downturn, to a certain extent, imposed a challenge to the mentality and practice of transitional bureaucratic system after 1997.
Post-colonial period (1997-)
According to Scott (2010: 11) , the structure and functions of the government and civil service remained largely unchanged after the handover. Most of the top civil servants retained their positions as Policy Secretariats (later called Directors of Bureaus) and the civil service was promised conditions of service no less favourable than before 1997. However, the civil service was also facing challenges arising from economic instabilities at global and local levels.
Economic downturn and globalization
After returning to China in July 1997, Hong Kong experienced an economic downturn under the Asian Financial Crisis. As the economy began to stagnate, property prices dropped significantly and unemployment rates increased steadily: the heyday of Hong Kong during the colonial rule disappeared. In order to buttress the economy of this city-state so as to revitalize it and even cope with the competition from neighbouring areas, notably Mainland China, the newly established government put forward a series of reforms in different policy areas, including the downsizing of the civil service and undertaking of education reforms. In this chapter, these education reforms are deployed as a case study, with a focus on how bureaucracy defines, interprets, implements and manipulates various policies so as to legitimize the state hegemony over the educational field in the name of improving the quality of education and of achieving excellence.
Case Study: Education Reforms and Teacher Engagement in Policy Formulation
and Implementation
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Background
In the policy address given by Tung Chee-hwa, the first Chief Executive, at a meeting of the Provisional Legislative Council, an ad hoc legislature supported by the Beijing government in order to handle the local affairs before and after Hong Kong returned to China, in October 1997, he emphasized that in order to keep up with the fierce competition arising from globalization and increasing economic strength, it was necessary for the newly established government to restructure the existing educational system. Tung's ambition to reform the entire educational system in order to face the above-mentioned challenges gave the educational bureaucracy a forceful excuse to fundamentally alter the whole system. The official orchestration of the entire process of consulting and implementing educational policies, in the main, manipulated the stakeholders and the public in the sense that they unconditionally accepted and 
Consultation on Proposals for Educational Reform (May to July 2000). The issue of
such a large number of consultation documents within three years (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) caused confusion, along with the uncertainty of (1) whether an open, transparent, accountable and predictable mechanism was established and operative in tapping the public views; (2) whether divergent opinions and views were categorized, analysed and presented systematically and openly during consultation, or the entire consultation was only a political show where the public views had a limited influence or were deliberately selected for those in favour of the official stance, and (3) whether different stakeholders, notably teachers, had equal status in the consultation, or the politically disadvantaged groups like teachers and parents were virtually excluded, marginalized and ignored during the consultation exercise.
Bureaucratic interpretation of teacher professionalism
In formulating educational policies, the role and status of teachers within the profession is of key concern. However, given the fact that the educational bureaucracy defines the nature and features of teacher professionalism, teachers are supposed to observe and even meet the official requirements in order to be deemed professional.
Teacher professionalism is a concept that has been subject to divergent, controversial interpretations over time. Sweeting (1992: 1) noted the existence of 'a lack of clarity in much educational discourse about the concept of professionalism, which tends to float uneasily between claims about attitudes, aspirations towards a collective solidarity, and the emergence of an ideology'. Rizvi and Elliot (2005) propose four dimensions of teacher professionalism, notably (1) teacher efficacy (focusing on teachers' adoption of new classroom strategies), (2) teacher practice (referring to the actual teaching experience), (3) teacher collaboration (collaborating in teaching and planning), and (4) teacher leadership (meaning that teachers should undertake and enhance leadership roles in formulating policies and making decisions). In other 13 words, the first two dimensions focus on enhancing the skills and knowledge of teachers, whereas the last two recognize the institutional and social engagement of teachers in school settings.
In the Hong Kong context, teacher professionalism is deliberately defined to be technical and instrumental. Lee (1993) critically reviewed the concept of 'teacher professionalism' and found that the official discourse on teacher professionalism is narrowly equivalent to 'professional development', which is defined as (1) training and development, (2) knowledge and skills, (3) competence, and (4) In light of Lee's criticism of the official discourse on teacher professionalism, the above features interpret teacher professionalism as continuous learning, but they ignore professional autonomy, a key component for empowering teachers. The above features reflect the emphasis on efficiency in the teaching profession, meaning that teachers serve as tools to ensure the success of education reforms (Choi, 2003: 637-9) .
School-Based Management: Illusion of decentralization?
In 1991, the colonial government introduced the School Management Initiative (SMI)
scheme. The scheme offered a school-based management (SBM) framework to improve the quality of primary and secondary schools. Furthermore, the educational bureaucracy still has a certain degree of power to restrain teachers without convincing justification. According to the Education (Amendment) Ordinance, Permanent Secretaries may refuse an applicant as a manager of a school if it appears that 'the applicant is not a fit and proper person to be a manager '. 3 In addition, the ordinance does not remove the ambiguous yet absolute power exercised by Permanent Secretaries, stating that they may refuse to register an applicant as a teacher if it appears to them that the applicant 'is not a fit and proper person to be a teacher'. 4 Furthermore, Permanent Secretaries may cancel the registration of a teacher based on their own discretion and judgement. 5 In other words, Permanent Secretaries hold the absolute power to remove a teacher if they believe that the teacher is lacking in professional abilities or cannot meet moral standards without a set of explicit guidelines. There is no mechanism for appeal. In sum, official surveillance of teachers still persists, even in the face of school-based management.
Administrative surveillance: Self-evaluation and external evaluation
Under the SBM, the EDB requires all schools to conduct a self-evaluation exercise, which is a process appraising the school's own performance, a critical point for enhancing the school development and accountability framework. Schools can refer to the performance indicators articulated and recommended solely by EDB, and may also develop additional criteria to assess their own specific features (Education and 5 Ibid. 'The Permanent Secretary can cancel teacher registration for the following reasons: (1) if it appears to the Permanent Secretary that the teacher is incompetent; (2) if the teacher has contravened any provision of this Ordinance; (3) if it appears to the Permanent Secretary that the teacher has behaved in any manner which, in the opinion of the Permanent Secretary, constitutes professional misconduct; or (4) if it appears to the Permanent Secretary that the teacher has behaved in any manner which, in the opinion of the Permanent Secretary, is prejudicial to the maintenance of good order and discipline in the school in which the teacher teaches. In addition, the Permanent Secretary may refuse to register an applicant as a teacher if it appears that the applicant (1) has been convicted of an offense punishable with imprisonment; (2) is a person in respect of whom a permit to teach has previously been cancelled; (3) is medically unfit; (4) does not possess the prescribed qualifications; (5) has attained the age of 70 years; or (6) in making or in connection with any application for registration as a manager or a teacher; or to employ a person as a permitted teacher in a school, has made any statement or furnished any information which is false in any particular material, or by reason of omission of any particular material.' 'Grounds for cancellation of registration of a teacher', Education Ordinance, Chapter 279, Section 47.
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Manpower Bureau, 2004a: 9). In addition, when schools are required to conduct selfevaluation as an internal quality assurance process, the EDB conducts inspections as an external quality assurance mechanism. 6 Schools are required to submit annual school plans and reports to the EMB, with reference to the EDB-issued School Performance Indicator (2002) . Based on the performance indicators framework, a set of key performance measures is adopted to support school self-evaluation (Education Department, 2002) . Such administrative work not only significantly increases the burden on teachers, but it also provides a legitimate channel for the official intervention of school affairs on the grounds of public accountability. However, the framework virtually only entails upward accountability rather than downward accountability, because the indicator is articulated solely by the educational bureaucracy.
Politics of funding
In Transforming Schools into Dynamic and Accountable Professional Learning
Communities: School-based Management Consultation Document, the government proposed that a school would have flexibility over the deployment of its funds and would receive a block grant to provide for both salary and non-salary expenses (ACSBM, 2000: 17) . In addition, the school would 'decide its own personnel policies, including the establishment, mix of staff, recruitment, deployment, professional development, rewards and compensation, performance management, and dismissal' (ACSBM, 2000: 6) . The official discourse emphasizes that a flexible arrangement of expenditure is pertinent to making the self-management of school affairs possible.
However, teacher managers are only responsible for (1) bringing their experience in curriculum development, classroom instruction, student activities, and educational enrichment to SMCs; (2) providing professional expertise for the improvement of student learning and associated school management; and (3) being a solid link between SMCs and school staffs (ACSBM, 2000: 17) . Teacher managers, judging from the above description, have almost no say in the expenditures of school authorities under the management framework, because they are only responsible for 'student' issues, and the SMC only 'informs the stakeholders of the approved budget' (Education and Manpower Bureau, 2004a: 8) . In fact, the introduction of a block grant entails a drastic alteration of the present funding allocation and arrangements for aided schools, because teachers' salaries would be fully arranged and determined by their school (Leung, 2003: 31) . In response, the Professional Teachers Union (PTU), a leading teacher union in Hong Kong, argues that such a practice encourages the misuse of expenditure by school authorities; salary cuts of teachers are possible within school administration and supervision, in the absence of democratic governance. School administrators have a certain degree of discretion on how to deploy funds without scrutiny, leading to distrust among teachers, as the PTU insists:
The school authorities have the power to deploy funds, including salaries of staff; this leads to the over-concentration of power in the decision making body.
Since a mechanism for scrutiny within the framework is lacking, the situation will become worse, meaning that a non-professional body (i.e., schoolsponsoring body) leads the professionals. The patron-client relationship will 22 be cultivated in this regard. Unlike in commercial firms, performance is not easy to evaluate objectively; jealousy and distrust would emerge among teachers, hampering unity and trust. Therefore, the PTU does not agree to the proposal to fully determine the personnel issue and salaries policy by the school authorities.
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The abortive attempt to form a General Teacher Council (GTC)
Following a recommendation made in Education Commission Report No. 7, the government provided for the formation of the GTC in 1999, with the following functions: (1) formulating policies of teacher registration, (2) dealing with the misconduct of educators, (3) shaping teacher education programmes, and (4) promoting professional education. 8 A Preparatory Committee was set up to facilitate the formation of the GTC. During the consultative period, controversies arose in relation to the scope of the GTC, which might conflict with the Education Department.
A discrepancy surfaced surrounding the power of teacher registration and deregistration. In fact, as mentioned above, the power of registration/de-registration is a 
Top-down approach of curriculum reform: The introduction of Liberal Studies
After the introduction of the New Academic Structure for Senior Secondary However, the introduction and articulation of the new subject manifests manipulation by the educational bureaucracy and school administrators in three ways: First,
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teachers have no say in deciding whether they are eligible to teach the new subject.
Two options usually prevail concerning the teaching arrangements for the new subject.
First, the principal recommends that certain teachers take the training programmes, implying that they will teach Liberal Studies; however, no accountable mechanism and open criteria exist to select those who can teach the subject. Second, the principal will withdraw some 'unpopular' subjects and ask those subject teachers to take the training programmes and teach the new subject in the future. The educational bureaucracy pays lip service to offering the appropriate training programme, with concrete support. Some teachers have to wait nine months before being enrolled in the course and then there is no relief from their usual heavy workloads for training, even though the EMB said a surplus teacher may be recruited for taking up their duties. In addition, many teachers criticize the setting of the sample examination paper, saying that some questions are problematic. The teachers cite ambiguous wording and complain that candidates' different interpretations of the question present difficulties to objective marking. Despite the fact that content was cut after it attracted severe criticism from the public, most teachers still question the suitability of adopting the examination format to assess students' performance, because it is difficult to establish an objective format to assess the scripts efficiently.
Analysis and Discussion
Reflecting upon Hong Kong's experience, education reforms have produced an adverse effect on engaging stakeholders, notably teachers, in policy-making and decision-making arenas. The government has adopted strategies of dedemocratization and centralization, to be implemented by school-sponsoring bodies An investigation of whether teachers can be influential under SBM would focus not only on the availability of opportunities for participation, but also on whether SBM enhances teachers' capacity to participate by ensuring the transformation of the fundamental power structure of school management from an authoritarian to a democratic style. This change would mean that teachers are no longer restrained the teaching profession, 6.8 to administrative duties, 6.7 to continuous studies, and 6.2 to the managerial pattern of a principal, showing that education reforms increasingly disempowered teachers. Finally, the educational bureaucracy should be restrained from intervening in school administration, in order to respect and recognize the autonomy of school authorities.
However, the educational bureaucracy adopts the term 'teacher empowerment' and defines it partially in the following ways: (1) (Education and Manpower Bureau, 2003: Foreword) .
Using the supervisory approach, teacher appraisal is 'a continuous process for identifying, evaluating, and developing the performance of teachers, so that the goals and objectives of schools are more effectively achieved, while at the same time benefiting teachers in terms of recognition of performance, professional development, and career guidance' (Ibid.: 1). Throughout the examination of the teacher appraisal mechanism, it should be noted that accountability is not understood by answerability to teachers, the willingness of authorities to explain their actions and decisions, and political responsibility in which authorities accept the consequences of their mistakes (Scott, 2005: 20) . Instead, it is narrowly defined as setting targets for assessing teachers' performance, identifying those who are underperforming so that schools can collect teachers' records for promotion and review (Education and Manpower Bureau, 2003: 3) . The implementation of self-and external evaluation legitimizes the centralization of official supervision of school administration on the grounds of enhanced school accountability. School accountability, in turn, is selective and discriminatory in the sense that the appraisers 'should be of a higher rank than those appraised' and they can determine the contents and areas of appraisal (Ibid.: 5 Under these circumstances, teachers exert weak influence in the administration.
Arthur Li, Secretary for Education and Manpower, mentioned that the government offers a subsidy for school development. The extra funding can be used to recruit surplus teachers and teaching assistants to share the workload, but it is questionable whether the funding will be spent on alleviating teachers' burdens, given the fact that teachers have no say in its allocation and deployment (Au, 17 
Conclusion
This chapter delineates in detail how the educational bureaucracy in Hong Kong follows the colonial practice of efficiency and then transforms it to a hegemonic and manipulative approach to reform the educational system in the name of striving for excellence and of getting rid of the problems arising from the colonial system.
Basically, there were no fundamental changes of approach before and after 1997, as reflected in how the educational bureaucracy, by adopting the administrative 33 hegemony and executive-led governance, designed and implemented the educational policy based on the economic and social context, regardless of the introduction of vocational education in face of rapid industrialization in the 1970s and 1980s, the professionalization of teachers in the 1990s in connection with the development of the financial and trading centre, and the undertaking of education reforms since 1998 in order to buttress competitiveness. Of course, the changing political environment after the return to Mainland China has politicized the education policy. This is shown in the introduction and promotion of national education in order to buttress the Chinese identity amongst students, whereas the colonial government tended to depoliticize the civic education without promoting civic consciousness and political participation.
Reflecting upon the above discussion, the power of educational bureaucracy remains intact after 1997 under the persistence of the hegemony in policy discourse and formulation so that no forceful stakeholders, such as unions or teachers, can challenge the official propaganda and undertaking. This was reflected in how the introduction of a General Teacher Council was efficiently rejected by the government on the excuse of efficiency and uncertain policy outcomes.
In the policy dimension, teacher engagement in policy formulation and implementation under education reforms achieves very little towards empowering teachers; instead, the official discourse on teacher professionalism becomes a powerful tool to manage and even manipulate them. It is interesting to question the manipulative approach of education reforms with reference to two remarks. First, without the introduction of a democratic framework in school settings, the idea that teacher participation in professional development can refresh and enrich their professional knowledge, skills, and experiences, and contribute to the collective 34 intelligence of the whole school, is unfounded. These ideals cannot be realized under an authoritarian setting. Second, even though teachers are professionalized, it does not mean that their professional status is fully defended and respected under the persistence of the top-down, guanxi, authoritarian style in school management endorsed by the educational bureaucracy. Hence, 'professional disempowerment' is proposed to delineate the dilemma faced by teachers: The more teachers become professional, the more they are disempowered under the official definition with the manipulation and orchestration of professionalism.
